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Background: Regulation of the pharmaceutical sector is a challenging task for most governments in the
developing countries. In Tanzania, this task falls under the Food and Drugs Authority and the Pharmacy Council. In
2010, the Pharmacy Council spearheaded policy reforms in the pharmaceutical sector aimed at taking over the
control of the regulation of the business of pharmacy from the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority. This study
provides a critical analysis of these reforms.
Methods: The study employed a qualitative case-study design. Data was collected through in-depth interviews,
focus group discussions and document reviews. Data was analyzed thematically using a policy triangle framework.
The analysis was done manually.
Results: The reforms adopted an incremental model of public policy-making and the process was characterized by
lobbying for political support, negotiations and bargaining between the interest groups. These negotiations were largely
centred on vested interests and not on the impact of the reforms on the efficiency of pharmaceutical regulations in the
country. Stakeholders from the micro and meso levels were minimally involved in the policy reforms.
Conclusion: Recent pharmaceutical regulation reforms in Tanzania were overshadowed by vested interests, displacing a
critical analysis of optimal policy options that have the potential to increase efficiency in the regulation of the business
of pharmacy. Politics influenced decision-making at different levels of the reform process.
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Tanzania Food and Drugs AuthorityBackground
Policy reform is a complex process which has been de-
scribed in the literature as being “profoundly political”.
Politics are inescapable because reforms affect vested in-
terests and usually tend to redistribute valued benefits
and harms among competing groups in a society [1].
Since these competing groups are not equally powerful
to influence decision-making [2], it is thus advisable to
undertake a stakeholder analysis in order to gain a clear
understanding of those who support or oppose the re-
forms in order to manage the politics of policy reforms
[1,3]. Reich (2002), argues that the process of policy* Correspondence: pax_amani@yahoo.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orchange should be approached through politics by apply-
ing adequate political skills and proper management of
the political process [4].
It is, however, unfortunate that more often than not
policy-makers concentrate on the content of the reforms
without placing enough emphasis on the actors and pol-
itics of the reform process itself [5]. As a result, policy
reforms can become problematic and inefficient; such a
situation is reflected in the recent reforms of pharma-
ceutical regulation in Tanzania. Despite being among
the most important components of the healthcare sys-
tem, pharmaceutical reforms in developing countries
are amongst the least studied of health reforms [6].
Hence it is not surprising that there is a paucity of lit-
erature reviews about policy reforms of pharmaceutical
regulations in developing countries.d. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Tanzania
After independence, the pharmaceutical sector in Tanzania
was regulated by the Pharmacy and Poisons Ordinance,
which came under the Pharmacy Board. The ordinance
had undergone several amendments, the last one being
that of 1978 [7]. During the early 2000s, the Ministry of
Health, initiated structural reforms aiming to improve the
regulation of the pharmaceutical sector by separating pro-
fessional practice from pharmaceutical products. These ini-
tiatives established two institutions; the Pharmacy Council
and the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA). The
establishment of the TFDA and the Pharmacy Council
marked a new era in the regulation of the pharmaceutical
sector in Tanzania.
The composition and functions of the Pharmacy Council
The Pharmacy Council was established under the Phar-
macy Act No. 7 of 2002 to deal with professional matters.
The Act gives the Minister for Health and Social Welfare
the power to appoint a pharmacist from the public service
to be the Registrar of the Pharmacy Council [8]. The coun-
cil also has a deputy registrar and a secretariat. The core
functions of the Pharmacy Council include keeping the
registers of pharmaceutical personnel, monitoring and
regulating pharmacy practice and approving training insti-
tutions and their curricula [8].
The composition and functions of the Tanzania Food and
Drugs Authority
The Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority (TFDA) was
established in 2003, under the Tanzania Food, Drugs and
Cosmetics Act No.1 of 2003, with the aim of increasing
efficiency in the regulation and control of food, drugs,
medical devices, cosmetics, herbal drugs and poisons [9].
The Act gives the Minister for Health and Social Welfare
the power to appoint a Director General from among
those persons who possess relevant qualifications, ex-
perience and expertise sufficient to manage the affairs
of the authority. The Act mandated the TFDA to regu-
late the safety, quality and efficacy of pharmaceuticals
under its portfolio. Other key functions include the regis-
tration of all premises that manufacture, store and dis-
pense pharmaceuticals [9].
The structural reforms shifted over to the TFDA all
the functions of the Pharmacy Board, including its em-
ployees and infrastructure. The TFDA also inherited
well-defined sources of finance, such as fees charged for
registration, import and export of regulated products and
a share from Government budget subventions. On the
other hand, the Pharmacy Council was a very new insti-
tution and started with the appointment of a Registrar as
its first employee. With a very limited budget from the
Government, the Pharmacy Council found innovative newsources of finance, such as registration and professional
fees payable by pharmaceutical personnel and owners of
pharmacy premises, respectively.
Regulatory reforms with the Pharmacy Bill 2010
In April 2010 the Minister for Health and Social Welfare,
under the advice and initiatives from the Pharmacy
Council, tabled the Pharmacy Bill 2010 to the 9th Parlia-
mentary Session to reform pharmaceutical regulations in
Tanzania [10]. The proposed law intended to make amend-
ments to the TFDA Act No. 1 of 2003, in order to trans-
fer the registration and regulation of all premises that
manufacture, store and dispense pharmaceuticals from the
TFDA to the Pharmacy Council portfolio. This was despite
the latter’s limited capacity and experience in regulatory af-
fairs. The bill was withdrawn from Parliament during the
later stages after its submission.
In March 2011, the Minister re-tabled the Pharmacy
Bill Supplement to the 10th Parliamentary session [11].
After intense debate, the bill supplement was enacted by
Parliament as the Pharmacy Act, 2011 [12]. This study ana-
lyzes these pharmaceutical regulation reforms in Tanzania
by examining how politics, vested interests, power and in-




The study employed a qualitative case study design,
which is an empirical inquiry that investigates a con-
temporary phenomenon in its real-life context [13]. This
design was chosen because policy reforms are complex
and specific to social, economic and political conditions
[14]. The study adheres to RATS guidelines on qualitative
research [15].
Sampling and study participants
The study employed a purposive sampling method since
the aim was to explore the views and perspectives of a
broad range of stakeholders who participated in the
reforms and those who were likely to be affected by
the proposed reforms. Study participants represented
training institutions, public and private hospitals, ver-
tical programmes, the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare, the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority, the
Pharmacy Council, the Medical Stores Department, non-
governmental organizations and community pharmacists.
Data collection methods
Data was collected through in-depth interviews with key
informants, focus group discussions and document reviews
from April 2011-August 2012. Key documents that were
reviewed include: the Pharmacy Act 2002, the Pharmacy
Bill of 2010 and its supplement, the Pharmacy Act 2011,
Mori et al. BMC Public Health 2013, 13:651 Page 3 of 6
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/651the TFDA Act 2003, Parliamentary contributions on the
Pharmacy Bill 2010, published reports and 60 transcripts
that were solicited from mfamasiatz – an online discussion
forum for pharmacists. In-depth interviews were also held
with ten key informants using a pre-tested interview guide
to supplement the contributions gathered from the forum
under the title “Pharmacy Bill 2010”. The number of key
informants was determined by the level of data saturation.
Three focus group discussions were held with stake-
holders from meso and micro levels to supplement the
data collected by document reviews and interviews. Infor-
mal conversations were also held ad hoc with a number of
stakeholders in various places including meetings, confer-
ences, offices and eating places.
Data management and analysis
Interview data were transcribed and the printed hard cop-
ies were kept by the investigator. The analysis was done
manually using a thematic approach. Transcripts were read
repeatedly to identify conceptually similar fragments of
text, which were then analyzed according to the policy tri-
angle framework [5]. Analysis involved triangulation of
data collected by various methods.
Ethical clearance
Ethical clearance was granted by the MUHAS Ethical Re-
view Board. Key informants were asked for consent before
being interviewed. Informants agreed to participate in the
study on condition of anonymity.
Results
This section provides the results of the analysis of
the pharmaceutical regulation reforms with supporting
quotes from the study participants and document re-
views. Some informants were given code numbers to
maintain confidentiality.
Agenda setting
Some informants said that the agenda for the reforms
had been in the making for a couple of years. They said
that in 2006, the Pharmacy Council presented a concept
paper at a pharmacists’ conference, highlighting some
sections of the TFDA Act of 2003 which they believed
needed to be harmonized with its functions. The Pharmacy
Council and the TFDA unanimously agreed to convene a
meeting under the guidance of the then Pharmaceutical
Supplies Unit (PSU) to develop a proposal to be submitted
to the Minister for Health and Social Welfare. Within a
short time, the two institutions managed to identify key
sections that they proposed to discuss in the following
meetings. Informants said that the Pharmacy Council uni-
laterally forwarded the proposal they were working on with
the TFDA to the Minister of Health and Social Welfare for
further action.I remember the two institutions were working closely to-
gether after that conference on how to harmonize some of
the problematic areas of the TFDA Act No. 1 of 2003. There
was a meeting and we produced a paper highlighting spe-
cific sections which we thought we were supposed to work
on. The section about premise registrations was one of them.
I do not know what happened afterwards, we came to
realize that the paper was already at the Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare, we were all stunned! (Participant 3)
The content of the Bill and the enacted Pharmacy Act, 2011
The proposed bill aimed to repeal section 21 of the
TFDA Act No. 1 of 2003, which deals with the registra-
tion of premises and issuance of permits for businesses
dealing with medicines [9]. The bill proposed that the
Pharmacy Council should have the mandate to register
premises and issue permits for the sale, dispensing and
supply of medicinal products. These permits were cate-
gorized as retail, wholesale, institutional or of any other
business as the Council may deem necessary for the pur-
poses of the Act [10]. We learned through the interviews
and document reviews that behind this “goodwill” to im-
prove the regulation of the business of pharmacy there
was a hidden interest by pharmacists. Many pharmacists
who contributed about the topic in the discussion forum
shared the same view that the proposed law should be
supported because it protects the interests of pharma-
cists. One of them commented:
One of the core functions of the Pharmacy Council is to
protect the interests of pharmaceutical personnel, and
since the Pharmacy Council will always have a registrar
who is a pharmacist then we are safe. So why not put the
premises under the Pharmacy Council to secure our in-
terests from other professions? (Participant 15)
Document reviews showed that, since the enactment
of the TFDA Act No. 1 of 2003 and its subsequent im-
plementation, the Government of Tanzania, through the
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, has invested a lot
of resources in building up the capacity of the TFDA as
a regulatory authority to protect its people from sub-
standard and counterfeit medicines. This includes a sig-
nificant increase in the number of employees, from 52 in
2003 to almost 200 by 2011, to run the new operations
provided in the portfolio.
In 2006, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
delegated to the Prime Minister’s Office, Regional and
Local Government (PMO-RALG), some of the powers
and functions of the TFDA through the Tanzania Food
& Drugs Delegation of Powers Order of 2006, amended
in 2007 [16]. The TFDA had worked with PMO-RALG
to establish Council Food and Drug Committees (CFDC)
that were mandated to discharge some of the regulatory
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macies) dealing with the sale of pharmaceuticals in their
locality. In the long term, this would have decentralized
regulation closer to where it was needed, since the ma-
jority of the Councils had already established CFDCs
with a reporting structure to the TFDA.
To a large extent, those who were against the policy re-
forms were cautious about the capacity of the Pharmacy
Council to deal with the regulation of pharmacy busi-
nesses. Many felt there was no justification for the Phar-
macy Council to engage with the business of pharmacy
since the TFDA was already making good progress in
that area. One Member of Parliament warned that these
reforms would have counterproductive consequences,
hence compromising the achievements of the TFDA
in that area [17].
All of Section IV of the bill which deals with the busi-
ness of pharmacy should be removed; the bill should deal
with professional issues only. This is how we can do just-
ice to our nation; otherwise we will enter into major
problems. We want to start new things for no good rea-
sons, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare must tell
us what were the shortcomings observed when the busi-
ness of Pharmacy was under the TFDA, that’s the only
way we can endorse this bill. – Parliamentary Contribu-
tion to the Pharmacy Bill 2010 [18].
In spite of strong opposition from Members of Parlia-
ment, the enacted Pharmacy Act, 2011, retained Section
IV of the bill, which authorizes the Pharmacy Council to
register premises and issue permits for businesses deal-
ing with medicines. Specifically, the Pharmacy Council
was mandated to issue permits for retail, distribution, in-
stitutional or any other business as it may deem fit for
the purposes of the Act, while the TFDA was left with
the manufacturing and wholesale permits [12]. In our
opinion, this decision was reached to create a win-win
situation for the two institutions but unfortunately cre-
ated more contradictions among their clients. While the
main responsibility of the Pharmacy Council is to regu-
late professional practice and training, some stakeholders
wondered how this function relates to the registration of
premises. It is also not well understood how the once
contradictory bill was passed into an Act despite strong
opposition from Members of Parliament to cede the
TFDA’s roles to the Pharmacy Council [17].
Process
The process that produced the bill and its subsequent
submission to Parliament was not transparent and was
conducted ad hoc. The process was initiated by the Phar-
macy Council as an agenda setter. The proposed bill was
endorsed by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare,which submitted it to Parliament. The bill was returned to
the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Social Welfare
(PSCSW) for more discussions with stakeholders, who
were perceived not to have been involved to a sufficient ex-
tent. Some of the informants who participated in the dis-
cussions about the bill within the PSCSW said that they
witnessed a lot of lobbying activities for political support
among the two rival groups.
It was all about lobbying for political support, some
people lobbied to be part of the committee, others lobbied
the members of the committee from outside, and it was
chaotic! (Participant who attended PSCSW meeting)
Stakeholder involvement
There were both visible and hidden participants in the pol-
icy review process; hence, it was difficult to know exactly
who was involved and who was not. However, officials in
the Pharmacy Council, the TFDA and the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare were the most prominent actors
behind the pharmaceutical regulation reforms. The Phar-
macy Council as the agenda setter, along with the Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare, supported the reforms while
the TFDA opposed them. The TFDA was accused of work-
ing through informal political channels to block the bill
and some officials were even threatened with dismissal
from their positions.
Stakeholders at the micro level, such as community
pharmacists and owners of premises, were minimally in-
volved. Informants said that only a few representatives,
particularly from the pharmacy training institutions,
were involved. In an attempt to address concerns about
the inadequate involvement of stakeholders, the Parlia-
mentary Standing Committee for Social Welfare invited
some stakeholders to discuss the content of the bill after
it had been removed from Parliament. Information about
who was invited was not made public and it was not obvi-
ous whose opinions these representatives were going to
convey in the meeting. It was during this time that there
was an outcry from the community of pharmacists that the
bill was again being treated with secrecy without their full
involvement. The bill was not made available to the public
and it was only through informal channels that hard copies
were accessible. The opinions of stakeholders who were
not invited by the Parliamentary Standing Committee for
Social Welfare were unlikely to be chanelled onto the dis-
cussion table.
(…) of all the things, the most interesting and annoying
one is where stakeholders were bypassed and instead lob-
byists went to Parliament in Dodoma. Is this where we
have reached! What were they worried about? Everything
with this bill suggests it is for personal interests and short
sightedness. (Participant 50)
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This study shows that, as has previously been docu-
mented, policy reform is largely a political process and
that politics affect the origins, formulation and imple-
mentation of public policy [1]. The first bill was with-
drawn from Parliament after its submission because the
opposing group was powerful enough to block it from
going through. This scenario has been explained in the
literature in terms of actors having unequal power to in-
fluence decision-making [2] and that some are better
placed in the system than others to block proposed re-
forms [5]. The influence of politics twisted the flow of
events and dramatically sculpted the reforms to match
the interests of the most powerful stakeholders [14].
These vested interests and powers ensured that a com-
promise deal was struck whereby the Pharmacy Council
took over the regulation of retail premises while the
TFDA retained control of wholesale and manufacturing
premises [12].
It is unfortunate that the Pharmacy Council as the
agenda setter did not recognize the influence of political
power in the reform process. In managing the politics of
competing groups in policy reform, a clear understand-
ing of who is supporting the reform, who is against it,
and who is not mobilized in one direction or the other
is a critical point that can never be overlooked [1]. With
clear information on power differences, policy reforms
must involve political negotiations between the key ac-
tors affected by the reforms. Negotiations must proceed
with great caution to avoid ending up with a policy re-
form proposal that reflects the interests of the key actors
at the expense of more feasible and efficient solutions.
This study reveals a typical example of the incremental
model of policy-making. In this model, bargaining, nego-
tiations and adjustments between interest groups play
major roles in determining decision outcomes, displacing a
critical analysis of optimal policy options [19]. Decision-
making in the incremental model is to large extent a polit-
ical activity rather than a technical one and the outcomes
differs only marginally from the existing ones [19,20].
The study also shows that the interests and preferences
of a small group of elite actors influenced decision-making
[2]. The Pharmacy Council claimed to have invited repre-
sentatives from various institutions and groups to convey
ideas at the policy table; however, as was reported in an-
other study, the said representation was neither adequate
nor sufficient [21]. Prior to the submission of the proposed
bill to Parliament, there was supposed to be extensive and
comprehensive stakeholder discussion to build consensus.
Because of the lack of consensus among the competing
groups, the reform process was difficult, time-consuming
and used more resources than had initially been predicted.
Use of other methods, such as professional associ-
ation meetings and interviews with stakeholders, couldhave been used to gather information. This would have
helped to shape the content of the reform before tabling it
in Parliament.
Strengths and limitations
One of the major strengths of this study is that data
were collected by different methods and were triangu-
lated during analysis to increase the validity of its find-
ings. Despite this, the study had two major limitations;
firstly, qualitative methods are prone to information bias,
which can only be minimized but not eliminated. For ex-
ample, during interviews informants may forget valuable
information which is relevant to the study. Secondly, we
might have missed to interview some people whom we
believe may possess important information related to
this study, although we are optimistic that their opinions
would not have changed our conclusion.
Conclusion
Recent pharmaceutical regulation reforms in Tanzania
were overshadowed by vested interests displacing a crit-
ical analysis of optimal policy options that have the
potential to increase efficiency in the regulation of the
business of pharmacy. Politics influenced decision-making
at different levels of the reform process. As such, regulation
of the business of pharmacy remains a major challenge in
Tanzania. The government should intervene by putting in
place a better regulatory mechanism aiming to protect the
public interest. The government should also be more vigi-
lant about limiting the influence of political power in policy
reform processes to avoid the compromise of efficiency by
personal interests. Otherwise the risks of undoing previous
strides made in pharmaceutical regulation are very great
and real, and this would have a devastating impact on pub-
lic health.
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